Prior to the 1964 flood, the South Fork Trinity River had abundant salmon and steelhead runs. Numerous studies have chronicled the cause for the decline of these runs, yet many of the measures needed to reverse the decline have not been implemented. Lack of action, in some cases, is the result of poor communication or cooperation between agencies with overlapping jurisdictions.
Timber Harvest and Road Building Still Pose High Erosion Risk
Studies by the CDWR (1979; 1982a) found that logging practices on South Fork Mountain had led to severe erosion and loss of fish habitat in the South Fork Trinity River. Recommendations were made to change timber harvest and road building activities to minimize risk of future problems. Although the U.S. Forest Service changed timber harvest practices substantially, the California Department of Forestry still allows extensive clear cuts on this unstable terrain (see Chapter V). The California Department of Fish and Game bears some responsibility for lack of follow-through on implementation of the measures suggested by CDWR, since it commissioned the studies. Because CDWR has been represented on the Trinity River Task Force, that body was also aware of problems on South Fork Mountain and should have addressed the problems and worked more for needed changes.
The continuing disparity between timber harvest practices on USFS and private lands is best illustrated by management of the Grouse Creek watershed, a major South Fork Mountain tributary to the South Fork Trinity River. Six Rivers National Forest has discontinued all timber sales due to concerns over cumulative watershed effects. Despite substantially impaired fisheries productivity (Fuller, 1990), CDF continues to allow additional timber harvest and road building on private lands in the basin. The Grouse Creek case study exemplifies CDF's lack of ability to deal effectively with cumulative watershed effects (LSA, 1990). Under current forest practice rules, cumulative effects analysis is largely conducted by, and heavily relies on the judgement of, Registered Professional Foresters (RPFs). As a rule, RPFs have little training in the evaluation of aquatic resources, analysis of landscape stability or erosion and sedimentation issues.
After several reviews, California Forest Practice Rules have failed to be approved as Best Management Practices by the EPA. This means that timber harvest practices have not been found to meet the requirements of maintaining water quality under the Clean Water Act. Logging operations have been exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because of legislative and administrative fiat. Lack of ratification of Forest Practice Rules as BMP's has not yet caused a re-evaluation of this status for THPs under CEQA
.Staff at the NCRWQCB and within CDFG was increased after the "208 Review" (SWRCB, 1987) showed that nearly 50% of timber harvests inspected had violations of California Forest Practice Rules. Despite increased staff, neither CDFG nor NCRWQCB have sufficient personnel to effectively participate in the review of all timber harvest plans. CDF still does not have the capability to provide basic information, such as cutting history of watersheds and existing road networks, to staff of CDFG and NCRWQCB, which hampers effectiveness of cumulative effects analysis (Bill Condon, personal communication).
CDF is currently trying to get timber harvest regulation within the CDFG changed from regional management to central management in Sacramento. The request for this change in procedures is being made through the Resources Agency to provide better "uniformity" in review in various regions of the State. Governor Wilson, in a recent visit to the north coast, spoke of "bureaucratic delays" of proposed timber harvest plans (Times Standard 6/8/93). The governor has ordered CDF and CDFG to implement new, streamlined procedures, within 60 days, for reviewing timber harvest plans (Times Standard 6/8/93). Such directives send the signal to agency staff that timber production is of paramount importance, and should take clear priority over wildlife and fisheries concerns.
Agencies Unable to Resolve Water Diversion/Fisheries Conflicts
The SWRCB (1986) found that a large diversion on Big Creek constituted an "unreasonable use" of water and ordered that the diverter increase efficiency of use (see Chapter VI). The changes requested by SWRCB were never implemented but enforcement actions were never taken. The water permit for the same diversion was found to be riparian and not a pre-1914 appropriative right. Riparian water right holders are not allowed to impound water or to use that water except in areas adjacent to the stream. However, ponds have been created to store Big Creek water and the diversion ditch has been extended so that water is delivered to the nearby Duncan Gulch watershed. The CDFG has not challenged the diversion of water into Duncan Gulch despite the SWRCB characterization of the water right as riparian. Staff suggests that it is beyond the authority of CDFG to challenge the diversion but that they can suggest mitigation (Phil Baker, personal communication).
The USFS failed to protect a prime recreational resource on its land on Hayfork Creek and to reduce risk of future erosion. A popular swimming hole at the water fall above the East Fork of Hayfork Creek suffered substantial degradation as a result of blasting related to reconfiguration of a diversion ditch on the hillslope above the site. Sharp rock was strewn along stream banks and deposited in the stream. Substantial disturbance to the hillslope has increased the risk of serious slope failure. The USFS contended that they had no jurisdiction over pre-1914 diversions and water rights. State water codes stipulate that ditches for riparian water diversions must not adversely effect the land over which they pass. The SWRCB only responds to active formal complaints or protests of water rights because they are lightly staffed. Since no complaint was filed by the USFS, the SWRCB has not become involved.
In 1988, the USFS also failed to comment on water rights applications by Sierra Pacific, Trinity County Fairgrounds and Trinity County Waterworks (Trinity County, 1988), despite the fact that additional diversions could have impact on aquatic habitat on USFS lands. CDFG did comment on Trinity County's Negative Declaration on these water rights and requested that adjudication of Hayfork Creek be carried out. No follow up by the Department on this issue has occurred.
In some years, the diversion for the East Fork Ranch on Hayfork Creek completely dries up the stream to the detriment of fisheries resources. The SWRCB recognizes that dams for water diversions, regardless of when they were first put into use, are subject to CDFG code 5937 (Dan Frink, personal communication). The latter statute, passed in 1934, requires that all dams pass sufficient stream flows to sustain fish life below them. CDFG seems remiss in not filing a formal complaint with SWRCB regarding the loss of all flows in Hayfork Creek or to move directly to enforce code 5937.
Failure of Harvest Management Poses Threat to South Fork Salmon
The basic mechanisms of fisheries harvest management are covered in Chapter VII. Fundamental failure of various players in harvest management has led to a serious conservation problem for Klamath basin salmon stocks, including those that return to the South Fork Trinity River.
The Klamath Fisheries Management Council (KFMC) was set up to guide allocation of anadromous fisheries resources from the basin while allowing for adequate escapement to facilitate restoration of stocks. Dwindling abundance of Klamath fall chinook salmon stocks has created dissatisfaction among user groups which are represented on the KFMC. Consequently, the KFMC has failed in its duty to recommend allocation of fall chinook salmon resources to the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC) every year since its inception, except in 1993 (Tom Stokely, personal communication). In 1993, the Secretary of Interior challenged the PFMC allocation which was based on KFMC recommendations. Secretary Babbit declared that Indian Tribes in the Klamath basin were entitled to 50% of any harvestable surplus. Allocation was eventually carried out by negotiation between the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior. Administration of the KFMC has taken a substantial portion of funds away from the Klamath River Restoration Program and occupied staff time that could otherwise be devoted to restoration.
The PFMC continues to manage Klamath basin fall chinook stocks as an aggregate unit. Ocean range and stock abundance are judged using coded wire tagged hatchery fish. This harvest management system fails to protect depressed wild stocks, such as South Fork Trinity River chinook and coho salmon. Despite several stocks being listed under ESA in other rivers in the Pacific Northwest, the PFMC is resisting needed changes in management. Under the Magnusen Act of 1976, which set up regional management councils such as the PFMC, all members sitting on these panels were granted categorical exemptions from conflict of interest. The result is that fishermen sit in judgement on how seasons are set, often to the detriment of the resource. While short term decisions allow greater access and economic opportunity, over-exploitation leads to long term drops in stock productivity (Fraidenberg and Lincoln, 1985).
A report by NMFS (1992) shows a pattern of stock declines for fisheries in near shore waters around the entire coast of the United States. Several salmon stocks regulated by the PFMC have recently be recognized as being "over-harvested" (PFMC, 1992a; 1992b). The three consecutive all time low escapements of Klamath fall chinook salmon, from 1990-1992, have now triggered formal designation of that stock as "over-fished" under Amendment 10 of the Magnusen Act.
Previous Efforts To Restore South Fork Trinity River Fall Short
The problems of South Fork Trinity River salmon and steelhead stocks have been well recognized by agencies for more than a decade yet stocks continue to decline. The Model Steelhead Stream Demonstration Program (MSSDP) (Irizarry et al., 1985) helped build a cooperative spirit between the USFS and CDFG. Traditionally, the working relationship between the USFS and CDFG had been strained. CDFG felt that the USFS was not taking adequate steps to protect watershed and fish habitat in the South Fork Trinity River basin. Conversely, the USFS contended that habitat was under seeded and that lack of escapement was limiting fish production. The reluctance of CDFG to allow small scale rearing in the basin was a polarizing issue for many years. The USFS and CDFG had not developed joint, prioritized study and monitoring plans for the South Fork and its tributaries, resulting in duplication of effort, data gaps and poor exchange of findings and data.
In addition to the USFS and CDFG, a private non-profit sportsman's group, California Trout (Cal Trout), helped to foster the MSSDP. The organization framework proposed in the MSSDP, for fisheries restoration and enhancement activities in the South Fork, was never formalized or implemented. The MSSDP failed to reform timber harvest practices or to reduce erosion risk on private timber land. To its credit, the MSSDP may have played a role in the CDFG re-evaluation of small scale rearing. A rescue rearing program has been operated for steelhead in lower Tule Creek since 1987. The USFS has also made tremendous strides toward improving timber harvest practices to protect fish habitat. New riparian standards (USFS, 1993) will provide even better protection.
The cooperation between CDFG and the USFS on elements of the MSSDP actually underwent greater development in the forum of the Trinity River Task Force where both of these agencies are represented. These agencies, with the help of CCC labor, have implemented numerous habitat improvement projects throughout the basin.
Fish habitat inventories done by the USFS, with funding from the Trinity River Task Force, provides a much more detailed picture of stream habitat than previous, qualitative survey techniques. The data gathered now provide a baseline of information to judge the need for, and/or success of, various restoration measures. CDFG's scientific studies of spring chinook and winter steelhead give insight into the life history of these fish. The winter steelhead run estimates were the first ever conducted in the basin.
Despite identified needs for erosion control and prevention, particularly on South Fork Mountain, the Trinity River Task Force did little to address this problem until near the end of the restoration program. Formerly, the Task Force had a "hands-off" policy on expending effort and funds in the South Fork Trinity River basin, because it was considered "beyond cost-effective treatment." It has been a line of reasoning with limited basis in fact. Management of private forest lands, especially on South Fork Mountain, still remains a major impediment to solving erosion problems on South Fork Mountain.
ESA Creates New Challenges For Agency Cooperation
USFWS designation of the northern spotted owl as endangered, under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, now requires all Federal agencies to comply with recovery plan elements and to cooperate in minimizing impacts to this species by any program activities. If Pacific salmon species are listed, the National Marine Fisheries Service must also be consulted before any activity can take place. In the last year, the USFS has had to write over 5,000 "Section 7" consultations to NMFS in the Columbia River basin to show that no adverse impacts will result from various management activities in response to listing of several salmon stocks (Phil Janik, personal communication). In the South Fork Trinity River basin, management for spotted owl habitat is beginning to limit the timing and location where CDFG, CCC, and USFS in-stream structural enhancement may be installed. The USFS is taking pro-active steps, not only to comply with these requirements of USFWS for the northern spotted owl, but also to eliminate future necessity of listing Pacific salmon species (USFS, 1992).
Recent funding requests for further studies on the identification of gene resources of Trinity River basin chinook salmon stocks was blocked by the Trinity County Board of Supervisors. The concerns expressed were that stock identification might facilitate listing of sub-populations under ESA (see discussions of the ESA in Chapter II). This faulty logic and denial of current stock status does nothing to solve the inherent problems and causes of severely depressed salmonid populations in the basin. The Trinity River Task Force subsequently moved forward with such studies by funding through the USFWS service (Chuck Lane, personal communication).
While interagency communication and cooperation have improved, internal institutional barriers to effective participation in restoration activities locally still exist. Budget cuts plague both Federal, State and local agencies and threaten to render some ineffective in participating in restoration activities or fulfilling basic agency functions. Even more importantly, all agencies have problems related to program continuity because of staff turn over.
California Department of Fish and Game
The primary funding mechanism for CDFG has been hunting and fishing license sales and both have been declining in recent years. Like all State agencies, there is a prospect that CDFG may suffer staff cut-backs in attempts to resolve the huge State budget deficit. Biologists at the regional level within CDFG are now increasingly involved in environmental review and less able to routinely gather field information on fisheries resources. This change is causing loss of continuity of important database information on salmon and steelhead populations in northwestern California. The effectiveness of CDFG's line staff in protecting California's fish and game resources can sometimes be hampered as a result of upper level administration responding to pressures from SWRCB or CDF under the umbrella of the Resources Agency.
CDFG is now focusing its resources on critical watersheds, such as the Shasta River and South Fork Trinity River, where there are salmon stocks at risk. Inland Fisheries Division staff have been assigned these special studies, in recognition of insufficient personnel at the local district level. This bureaucratic shift of human resource allocation seems to work in favor of the South Fork Trinity River at this time, but could be equally detrimental if conditions change.
In the Trinity River basin, much of the resources necessary for monitoring have come from the Trinity River Task Force (1992). If the Trinity River Fish and Wildlife Management Program fails to be re-authorized by Congress, CDFG might suffer cutbacks in resources available for South Fork Trinity monitoring.
California Department of Forestry
The latest review of California Timber Harvest Practices as Best Management Practices under the Federal Clean Water Act showed that staff within CDF was operating under the tacit assumption that their right to infringe on timber harvest activity on private land was limited (SWRCB, 1987). The supremacy of private property rights comes into direct conflict with protecting public trust resources, including downstream water quality and fisheries resources.
CDF annually spends a considerable amount on research projects, but the information gathered is not always translated to changes in forest management. For example, the Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station in Arcata (Redwood Sciences Lab) conducted amphibian studies for CDF in the Mattole watershed in the Coast Range. The study found a remnant population of tailed frogs (Aschapus truei) and Olympic salamanders (Rhyacotriton olympicus), and described population declines associated with cumulative watershed effects (Welsh, 1990). Three years later CDF has yet to formulate a plan in the Mattole watershed to prevent the local extinction of these indicator species.
Other CDF studies have focused on the collection of general information, instead of more focused studies that could help define specific changes in regulations and operating practices needed to protect public trust resources. For example, the California Division of Mines and Geology (under CDF contract) is currently studying inherent natural soil erodibility of timberlands throughout California. A major shortcoming of the study is that it is not designed to consider the influence of land use disturbance on erosion risk, and may have limited utility for integration into land management decisions.
One important resource management issue that has not been thoroughly developed by CDF is the development of a comprehensive geographic information system (GIS) database within which to store resource and land management information. Such a system would allow timber harvest reviewers to quickly access information needed to make sound resource decisions. A GIS database could include information needed to quickly assess potential cumulative effects, threats to listed species, erosion hazards, past management actions, soil and slope data, stand characteristics, archaeological information and a host of other resource characteristics. Efficient use of a GIS system could free inspectors to spend more time accessing problems in the field. Failure to build a comprehensive database is now slowing review and administrative processes.
Institutional barriers to protecting dwindling anadromous fish populations, such as those of the South Fork Trinity River basin, are readily visible in the application of rules governing cumulative watershed effects on private lands. In reviewing CDF files for the South Fork Trinity River basin, no timber harvesting plans were discovered that had identified watersheds on South Fork Mountain as exhibiting serious cumulative watershed effects. Logging plans have not been deferred or denied, and rates of private land timber harvesting apparently have not diminished, in spite of degraded watershed conditions identified in these same watersheds by CDWR and USFS scientists, and despite severely depressed populations of anadromous fish in the basin.
It does not appear that regulations governing cumulative watershed effects are sufficient, or are being rigorously applied, to these impacted sub-watersheds. This may result from an inherent lack of enforceability in the regulation, or it may result from the fact that Forest Practice Inspectors simply do not have the data or the detailed knowledge to scientifically support findings which would result in denial or significant modification of harvest plans submitted by industrial landowner. In the absence of overwhelming supportive data, plans are approved. A report by LSA Associates (1990), commissioned by the Board of Forestry, stated that CDF was not yet dealing effectively with cumulative watershed effects. It predicted that unless the agency made substantial changes that court battles would continue and even increase. The Board of Forestry rejected the findings of the report. Chapter 12 continued